
Hartmut Esser

Die (Un-)Bedingtheit von Regeln und Normen

Das Modell der Frame-Selektion und die “Wirkmacht” von
Institutionen und Organisationen

Universität Mannheim
Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung

HSU Hamburg
27. Oktober 2010

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The (Un-)Conditionality of Rules and Norms

The Model of Frame-Selection and the “Causal Power” of
Institutions and Organisations

University of Mannheim
Faculty for Social Sciences
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research


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A challenging example from
rational choice theory...

Cooperation and Punishment in a Collective-Good-Game (Fehr&Gächter 2000;
Fehr & Gintis 2007)


Cooperation and Punishment in a Collective-Good-Game (Fehr&Gächter 2000;
Fehr & Gintis 2007): **Proportion „Cooperation“**

Cooperation and Punishment in a Collective-Good-Game (Fehr&Gächter 2000;
Fehr & Gintis 2007): **Proportion „Cooperation“**



... a (completely) different explanation!

The „Wallstreet-Game“ (Lieberman, Samuels & Ross 2004)



... even for extremely high costs!

The Rescue of Jews in Nazi Europe (Varese & Yaish 2000)

Factors of rescue behavior (logistic regression coefficients)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age (1940)	0.078**	0.109**
Gender (male)	-0.959**	1.890**
Educational level	-0.196	-0.229
Religious „RC“-Factors	0.468**	
Many neighbors	-0.890	
Cellar in house	-0.723	
Number rooms	0.295	
Urban/rural	-1.087	-0.979
„Resistance“	10.205	11.378

Personal call


2.847**

**most important
single factor!**

**„... I could not
deny!“**

... two (very) different mechanisms

mechanism 1



consideration of
consequences
to the future


... including
„social“ motives!




calculation
of
cost&benefits

rational choice

mechanism 2



decoding
of the past



activation
of a
„programme“

**normative
behavior**

two (very) different „types“ of action



**rational
choice**

conditional!

„**Rational action** – economically or politically motivated – **is concerned with outcomes**. Rationality says , 'If you want to achieve Y, do X'..“ (Elster 1989 (“Nuts and Bolts”): 113)

„I define **social norms** by the feature that they are **not outcome-oriented**. ... The imperatives expressed in social norms ... are **unconditional**.“ (Elster 1989 („The Cement of Society“): 98)



**normative
behavior**

unconditional!

mechanism 1



consideration of
consequences
to **future**

... regardless the
kind of motives!



calculation
of
cost&benefits

rational choice

conditional

mechanism 2



decoding
of the **past**



activation
of a
„programme“

**normative
behavior**

unconditional

... two models of man

**Homo
oeconomicus**

↓
consideration of
consequences
in the **future**

↓
calculation
of
cost&benefits

rational choice

conditional

**Homo
sociologicus**

↓
decoding
of the **past**

↓
activation
of a
„programme“

**normative
behavior**

unconditional

... and a third one

**Homo
oeconomicus**

**Homo
culturalis**

**Homo
sociologicus**

consideration of
consequences
in the **future**

„**meaning**“
of symbols
and „**cues**“

decoding
of the **past**

calculation
of
cost&benefits

„**interpretation**“
&
„**symbolic interaction**“

activation
of a
„**programme**“

rational choice

**mindful
orientation**

**normative
behavior**

conditional


„creative“

unconditional


„**logic of
calculativeness**“

„**logic of
appropriateness**“


... three main structural aspects
of social situations



... three social-science paradigms




... three conceptions of „rules“/„norms“/„roles“




... and **One for All:**
The Model of Frame-Selection

Main intuition



Three mechanisms




1. Pattern Recognition

Pattern Recognition

(Mis-)Match between mental models and situational objects

Activation of biological/socialized reaction-programs

Background: Cognition-Theory/Neuro-Science




2. Variable Rationality

Variable Rationality

Selection of different degrees of „elaboration“

two extremes: automatic-spontaneous vs reflexive-calculating


Background: Dual-Process-Theory/Schütz; Mead; Goffman; Garfinkel




3. Definition of Situation

Definition of the Situation


Selection of a certain „view“ of the situation („Framing“)
... with different degrees of „rationality“ and „conditionality“
Background: Schema-Theory/ Thomas, Allport, Abelson



The process



... and: “Action!”



Two Selections

two selections:

Modus-Selection: which degree of elaboration?

Model-Selection: which frame, script and action?

... jetzt wird's ein bißchen abstrakter.
Aber keine Panik!
(mehr im Anhang)


Modus-Selection

resulting EU-weights (for details see appendix: extension 0)

$$EU(as) = m_i U_i - (1-m_i)C_w$$

$$EU(rc) = pm_i (U_i - C) + p(1-m_i)U_{rc} - C + (1-p)m_i (U_i - C) + (1-p)(1-m_i)(-C - C_w)$$

...




resulting EU-weights

$$EU(as) = m_i U_i - (1-m_i)C_w$$

$$EU(rc) = pm_i (U_i - C) + p(1-m_i)U_{rc} - C + \\ (1-p)m_i (U_i - C) + (1-p)(1-m_i)(-C - C_w)$$

...





resulting EU-weights

$$EU(as) = m_i U_i - (1-m_i)C_w$$


$$EU(rc) = pm_i (U_i - C) + p(1-m_i)U_{rc} - C + \\ (1-p)m_i (U_i - C) + (1-p)(1-m_i)(-C - C_w)$$


...

$$\underbrace{(1-m_i)(U_{rc} + C_w)} > C/p$$




A graphical illustration





Model-Selection

Model-Selection



analogous stepwise for script- and action-selection ...

... depending on the activation weight of the respective
frame/script

Main implication: (un)conditionality

mechanism 1



consideration of
consequences
to future

... regardless the
kind of motives!



calculation
of
cost&benefits

rational choice

conditional

mechanism 2



decoding
of the past




activation
of a
„programme“

**normative
behavior**

unconditional

... and a typical statistical interaction
effect


The interaction of framing and RC-incentives



Empirical evidence?

Divorce, Embeddedness and Church Wedding
(Esser 2002)

Interaction Cohorts/Networks: Tr



„individual“ framing
church wedding/
„family“-attitude/
fit into wider relations

strong individual framing at
the beginning stabilizes under
all conditions

dense networks:
„social“ framing as „pair“

conditional!


unconditional!


unconditional!



Network dense

Network not dense


The Rescue of Jews
(Kroneberg, et. al. 2009)



 Das Bild kann nicht angezeigt werden. Dieser Computer verfügt möglicherweise über zu wenig Arbeitsspeicher, um das Bild zu öffnen, oder das Bild ist beschädigt. Starten Sie den Computer neu, und öffnen Sie dann erneut die Datei. Wenn weiterhin das rote x angezeigt wird, müssen Sie das Bild möglicherweise löschen und dann erneut einfügen.

 **High Prosocial Orientation (Empirical Max.)**
 **Low Prosocial Orientation (Empirical Min.)**

Voting and „civic duty“
(Kroneberg et. al. 2009)



Das Bild kann nicht angezeigt werden. Dieser Computer verfügt möglicherweise über zu wenig Arbeitsspeicher, um das Bild zu öffnen, oder das Bild ist beschädigt. Starten Sie den Computer neu, und öffnen Sie dann erneut die Datei. Wenn weiterhin das rote x angezeigt wird, müssen Sie das Bild möglicherweise löschen und dann erneut einfügen.

— High Civic Duty Norm (Empirical Max.)
 - - - Low Civic Duty Norm (Empirical Min.)

More examples:

Stability of (non-marital) partnerships (Hunkler&Kneip 2008)

Respondent behavior (Stocké 2006)

Educational decisions (Stocké 2009)

Environmental behavior (Best 2009)

Participation in high culture (Weingartner 2009)


Criminal Behavior (Kroneberg 2010)

Trust (blind vs reflected) (Rompf 2010)

...

... and the first case again: A re-interpretation


Cooperation and Punishment in a Collective-Good-Game (Fehr & Gächter 2000;





So weit erst mal!





Extension 0

Modus-Selection

Possible states of the world

	opportunities to find the valid case sufficient		opportunities to find the valid case not sufficient	
	frame i valid	frame i not valid	frame i valid	frame i not valid
alternatives	$p \cdot m_i$	$p \cdot (1 - m_i)$	$(1 - p) \cdot m_i$	$(1 - p) \cdot (1 - m_i)$
as-mode	U_i	$-C_w$	U_i	$-C_w$
rc-mode				

Possible states of the world

	opportunities to find the valid case sufficient		opportunities to find the valid case not sufficient	
	frame i valid	frame i not valid	frame i valid	frame i not valid
alternatives	$p \cdot m_i$	$p \cdot (1 - m_i)$	$(1 - p) \cdot m_i$	$(1 - p) \cdot (1 - m_i)$
as-mode	U_i	$-C_w$	U_i	$-C_w$
rc-mode	$U_i - C$	$U_{rc} - C$	$U_i - C$	$C_w - C$

right decision,
but rc-costs

wrong decision
and rc-costs

frame i is valid,
but rc-costs


resulting EU-weights

$$EU(as) = m_i U_i - (1-m_i)C_w$$

$$EU(rc) = pm_i (U_i - C) + p(1-m_i)U_{rc} - C + \\ (1-p)m_i (U_i - C) + (1-p)(1-m_i)(-C - C_w)$$

...

$$(1-m_i)(U_{rc} + C_w) > C/p$$




resulting EU-weights

$$EU(as) = m_i U_i - (1-m_i)C_w$$

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...




resulting EU-weights

$$EU(as) = m_i U_i - (1-m_i)C_w$$

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...

$$(1-m_i)(U_{rc} + C_w) > C/p$$



Extension 1

Reasons, Routines and Emotions

„Match“ mit
„Modell“


zB Schlange
im Wald...


rationale
Kalkulation
von
Nutzen&Kosten


Konsequenzen
in der Zukunft


spontane
Reaktion
nach
„Programm“

Prägung durch
Vergangenheit/
trigger












Eine Erweiterung ...




Extension 2


... das Gehirn,








... drei Pfade,














... drei Mechanismen,



... drei Reaktionen,





... dreimal “Darwin”



Extension 3

... das Gehirn und die drei
Menschenmodelle





Pattern Recognition

match not perfect

perfect match

**Motivation
Opportunity
Effort**

Variable Rationality

suitable

not suitable

rational choice

mindful interpretation

normative behavior

Utilitarian Paradigm

Interpretive

Normative Paradigm

One for All!

Definition of the Situation

und auch ...

